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Tort Liability of a University for Libelous Material in
Student Publications
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1819, Chief Justice John Marshall described an American system of higher education that was predominantly private and elitist
in nature.1 For nearly a century and a half thereafter, the courts had
no place on campus. A student traded his constitutional rights for the
privilege of a college education,2 and colleges enforced their own
system of norms and values.3 Courts of the day referred to the student-

1. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 640-49
(1819). But see O'Neill, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REv. 155,
156-58, 171 (1970) for the suggestion that Marshall's description of higher education was
inaccurate at the time and is even more inaccurate today.
2, See Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 25!1, 197 N.W. 510, 513 (1924) (female
students airing grievance in the public press sufficient grounds for dismissal). Cf. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
3. See Board of Trustees v. Waugh, 105 Miss. 623, 633-34, 62 S. 827, 830-31 (1914),
affd. 237 U.S. 589 (1915) (entrance to a state university conditioned upon pledge not to
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university relationship in terms of contract4 and in loco parentis.5
Higher education existed in its own separate world, where the Constitution was discussed but rarely applied.
The relationship of the law to the college campus has changed
drastically in the past fifteen years. The rising student militancy of
the 1960's, commonly known as the students' rights movement,6 and
the willingness of the courts to enforce student rights7 have restructured the relationship between the university and its students. Constitutional rights are no longer waived by college enrollment.8 Similarly, contract theory and in loco parentis have either fallen into disuse or have been repudiated. 9
One outgrowth of court enforcement of student constitutional
rights has been a series of cases limiting the right of a university to
censor student newspapers.1° Freed from the shackles of the university's editorial control, student writers may now speak with a frankness unheard of on campus even ten years ago; but these decisions
have produced an unprecedented situation for university administrators. On the one hand, outspoken student newspapers have created a
join fraternities); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N:Y.S. 435 (1928)
(female student dismissed for not being "a typical Syracuse girl"). See generally Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1135-37 (1968) [hereinafter Developments].
4. The use of contract theory in the college setting is exemplified by State v. White,
82 Ind. 278, 286 (1882), where the court noted: "Every student, upon his admission into
an institution of learning, impliedly promises to submit to •.• all the necessary and
proper rules and regulations which have been, or may thereafter be, adopted [by the
institution] ••••"
5. See Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913). See generally
Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1947). In loco parentis refers
to the idea that a college takes the place of the parent and assumes some of the parental
duties.
6. For the history and perspectives of the movement, see Students Protest, 395 ANNALS, May 1971, at 1-194.
7. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1968). See also Schwartz, The Student, the University, and the First Amendment, 31 Omo ST. L.J. 635 (1970); Van Alstyne, The
Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. R.Ev. 290 (1968);
Project-Procedural Due Process and Campus Disorder, 1970 DuKE L.J. 763; Developments, supra note 3, at 1128-43.
8. Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), dismissed
as moot sub nom. Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968). See also
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 n.2 (1969).
9. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
10. See notes 102-06 infra and accompanying text. The term "student newspaper" as
used throughout this Note refers to those newspapers which are official student organizations of a university. It is assumed that the newspaper has met the prescribed requirements for achieving that status. The term therefore does not include "underground
newspapers" which, though they may be published by students and distributed on
campus, have no formal ties to the university.
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serious potential for libelous and other irresponsible publications.11
Often large12 and influential,18 these newspapers can damage careers
and reputations. On the other hand, the newspaper, and the students
connected with it, may be incapable of compensating for the damaged
reputations of those defamed. The student author and editors responsible for the defamation may be judgment proof. The newspaper
itself may be an unincorporated association not subject to suit; 14 even
when suable, it may have few assets. Therefore, the university becomes a prime target for the defamed plaintiff.
Although several articles have suggested that the university may
be liable for the defamatory torts of a student newspaper,15 no reported case so holding has been found. In fact, Langford v. Vanderbilt
University 16 stood for thirteen years as the only reported case of a
university being sued for libel in a student publication. In that case,
the university argued that "it was not liable under the rule of respondeat superior, because the publication was not made by it or by
any servant or agent for it." 17 The court, however, did not reach this
issue, holding that the publication was privileged.18 Recently, Scelfo
v. Rutgers University 19 raised the same issue concerning the relationship of the university to its student newspaper. But again the court
was not forced to reach squarely the issue of the university's liability,
since it held that the publication was not defamatory and, alternatively, was privileged under the doctrine of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. 20 This lack of precedent belies the significance of the problem. An informal survey of twenty-six college and university attorneys
II. For example, Wayne State University's student newspaper, The South End,
recently published an allegedly anti-Semitic series of articles which caused a furor
within the Detroit-area Jewish community. Detroit Free Press, Jan. 31, 1973, at 14-A,
col. 1.
12. An informal survey of student newspapers conducted by the Review disclosed
that the 26 student newspapers which responded had annual budgets totaling 3.6 million dollars. See Appendix infra. See also Hudgins, Academic Freedom and the Student
Press, 6 WAKE FoREsr INTRA. L. R.Ev. 40, 41 (1969).
13. For example, one campus commentator believes that the Michigan Daily is the
most powerful student political force on The University of Michigan campus. Michigan
Daily, April 16, 1969, at 4, col. 7. See also Abbott, The Student Press: Some First Impressions, 16 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 1, 6-9 (1969).
14. See Marshall v. Longshoremen Local 6, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 371 P.2d 987, 22 Cal. Rptr.
211 (1962), for a brief survey of the case law on the liability of unincorporated associations.
,,,..-------15. Abbott, supra note 13, at 13-14; Fishbein, The University's Right of Control over
Student Publications, 5 COLLEGE CoUNSEL 65 (1970); Trammell, Student Publications and
Other Sources of Libel Within the University, in 3 ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE NAU..
ASSN. OF Col.LEGE AND UNIV. ATIORNEYS 7 (1963).
16. 44 Tenn. App. 694, 318 S.W.2d 568 (1958).
17. 44 Tenn. App. at 699, 318 S.W.2d at 571.
18. 44 Tenn. App. at 710-ll, 318 S.W.2d at 576.
19. 116 N.J. Super. 403, 282 A.2d 445 (1971).
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

--

-
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conducted by the Review uncovered seven unreported suits against
universities for libelous material in student publications.21
The implications of the past decade's expansion of first amendment rights are somewhat paradoxical. This expansion has created
a threat of a greater potential of defamation in student newspapers.
At the same time, a concurrent expansion of the protection afforded
the press for defamatory publications has reduced the likelihood of
a successful suit.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,22 the Court held that a public
official could not recover damages for defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct without proving "actual malice," which the
Court defined as knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard of the
truth. In later cases the Court broadened the coverage of the New
York Times privilege by first expanding the definition of public officials23 and later extending the doctrine to public figures acting in
matters of public interest.24 Furthermore, the Court narrowed the
scope of "actual malice" by defining reckless disregard of the truth to
mean false statements made with a high degree of awareness of their
probable falsity. 25 This definition was further limited to include only
those statements about which the speaker entertained serious doubts
when made. 26
Most recently, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,21 the Court
focused on the character of the reported event rather than of the
individual involved. Four members of the Court agreed that the
"actual malice" standard was applicable to a private individual's
claim if the alleged defamatory matter was of general public concern.28 The fifth member of the majority limited his concurrence to
reports concerning the actions of public officials with which private
individuals are connected.29 Three dissenting Justices in Rosenbloom
expressed a willingness to re-examine the scope of the New York
Times doctrine itself and, at least where a private individual is con21. Two universities provided citations. La Barge v. Daily Orange, Civil No. 70-6597
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., 5th Dist., April 8, 1972) (dismissed for failure to prosecute); Bruex v.
Snyder, Civil No. 724207H, (Mich. Cir. Ct., Kalamazoo County, filed November 2,
1972) (This action against the Western Michigan University Herald was active as of
Jan. 1, 1973.).
22. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
23. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 81 (1966).
24. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
25. Garrison v. Lonisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
26. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
27. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
28. This position was expressed by Justice Brennan in an opinion with which Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun concurred. Justice Black concurred separately,
reiterating his belief that "the First Amendment does not permit the recovery of libel
judgments against the news media even when statements are broadcast with knowledge
they are false." 403 U.S. at 57.
29. 403 U.S. at 62 (White, J., concurring).
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cerned, permit recovery upon proof of negligence and actual damage
while eliminating or restricting the possibility of punitive damages.30
Clearly, the New York Times doctrine stands as a significant barrier
to the imposition of liability for defamation. Given the division
among the Justices in Rosenbloom and the recent addition to the
Court of two new Justices since that decision, however, the precise
relationship between the first amendment and state defamation law
may be in a state of flux. 31
While attention will occasionally be drawn to the impact of the
New York Times privilege, this Note largely assumes that a defamed
plaintiff is capable of overcoming the constitutional barriers imposed
by New York Times and its progeny. In other words, the assumption
is made that libelous statements either fall outside the constitutional
privilege or that the plaintiff can demonstrate actual malice in the
student authors or editors.82 The Note will analyze the traditional
theories which may be invoked to establish the university's liability
for defamatory material in student publications.83 First, a range of
student newspaper-university relationships will be examined with
respect to vicarious liability. As will be seen, this issue is complicated
by possible first amendment limitations on a public university's right
to control its student publications for libel. Second, an alternative
theory of personal, rather than vicarious, liability will be considered.
In conclusion, several methods will be suggested through which a university might minimize its potential liability for libel in its student
publications.
30. In dissenting opinions both Justice Harlan and Justice Marshall, with whom
Justice Stewart concurred, agreed that proof of actual damages and some degree of
negligence was the appropriate standard. 403 U.S. at 66, 68-69, 86-87. The dissenting
opinions differed on the question of punitive damages, however. Justice Harlan would
allow punitive damages where they "bear a reasonable and purposeful relationship to
the actual harm done ••• and the plaintiff has proved the speaker acted out of express
malice ••••" 403 U.S. at 77. Justice Marshall would eliminate the recovery of punitive
damages entirely in defamation suits against the press. 403 U.S. at 83-86.
31. For a thoughtful discussion of Rosenbloom and the developments in this area,
see Comment, The Expanding Constitutional Protection for the News Media from
Liability for Defamation: Predictability and the New Synthesis, 70 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1547
(1972). See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 518-44 (1970);
Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967
SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 267; Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 191; Wright, Defamation, Privacy and
the Public's Right To Know: A National Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEXAS L.
R.Ev. 630 (1968).
32. This Note assumes that the plaintiff can overcome the doctrines of charitable and
sovereign immunity. See generally W. PROSSER, LA.w OF TORTS§§ 131, 133 (4th ed. 1971);
Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 480 (1971). The relative importance of the immunity problem is
declining inasmuch as the trend is toward the elimination of these doctrines. See W.
PROSSER, supra, § 133; Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change,
1966 U. !LI.. L.F. 919.
33. While this Note specifically examines defamatory material in student newspapers,
the general concepts should be applicable to other university-sponsored student publications.
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THEORIES OF LIABILITY

By the beginning of this century it was generally recognized that
a publisher would be held strictly liable for defamatory matter appearing in his newspaper,34 even when inserted without his knowledge85 or against his instructions.36 Liability was imposed not only
when the publisher or owner was an individual actively engaged in
the business, but also when the newspaper was a corporation.87 But
these decisions all dealt with commercial, not student, newspapers.
It is therefore necessary to determine whether the various theories
of liability used to reach a commercial publisher are sufficient to sustain an action against a university for libelous matter printed in a
student publication. Two theories, which will be referred to as vicarious liability and communication liability, will be considered.

A.

Vicarious Liability

Vicarious liability-also known as respondeat superior, imputed
liability, and enterprise liability-is a doctrine which imposes responsibility upon one person or entity for the torts of another because of
the relationship between them.38 While the origins of the doctrine
are obscure and its rationale has been much debated,39 vicarious liability is generally justified today by the enterprise concept.40 This
justification, however, does not identify precisely when vicarious liability will be imposed.41
34. Taylor v. Hearst, 107 Cal 262, 40 P. 392 (1895); Smith v. Utley, 92 Wis. 133, 65
N.W. 744 (1896).
35. Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152 (1871); Crane v. Bennet, 177 N.Y. 106, 69 N.E. 274
(1904).
36. Dunn v. Hall, 1 Ind. 344 (1849); Perret v. New Orleans Times, 25 La. Ann. 170,
173 (1873) (dictum). See Annot., 15 Am. St. R. 333 (1890).
37. See, e.g., Sweet v. Post Publishing Co., 215 Mass. 450, 102 N.E. 660 (1913); Park
v. Detroit Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888); Turton v. New York Re•
corder Co., 144 N.Y. 144 (1894); World Publishing Co. v. Minahan, 70 Okla. 107, 173 P.
815 (1913); Coffman v. Spokane Chronicle Publishing Co., 65 Wash. 1, 117 P. 596 (1911).
38. 2 F. HARPER&: F. JAMES, Tm: I.Aw OF TORTS § 26.1 (1956); w. PROSSER, supra note
32, § 69.
39. See generally T. BATY, VICARIOUS LlAJIILITY (1916); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Holmes, Agency, 4
HARV. L. R.Ev. 345 (1891); Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1923); Wig•
more, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History (pt. 2), 7 HARv. L. REv. 383 (1894).
40. An enterprise is conceived as being endowed with three characteristics which
make it a preferable loss bearer for torts caused by its employees. First, the enterprise
is thought to be in the best position to foresee the risks created by its activity. There•
fore, it is in the best position to minimize them. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Ad·
ministration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 586-87 (1929). Second, by definition the enterprise
deals in a market, Therefore, it can spread the burden of any losses among a mass audience. Calabresi, supra note 39, at 517-19. Finally, it can reflect the loss as a cost of
doing business, thereby facilitating a rational allocation of resources. Id. at 500-02.
41. See Douglas, supra note 40, for a thoughtful analysis which has not yet been
adopted in the case law.
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One common test states that vicarious liability will be imposed
upon (1) a principal for the torts of his agents, if, (2) the agent was
acting within the scope of his actual or apparent authority.42 This test
provides a satisfactory framework for analyzing the student newspaper-university relationship.

I. The "Authority" Requirement
To facilitate analysis the authority requirement will be examined
first. Assuming, for the moment, that an agency relationship exists
between the university, as principal, and its student newspaper, as
agent, the problem is to determine the range of defamatory torts that
are within the scope of the student authors' and editors' authority.
Only in regard to these torts will the university be held liable.
Several types of authority are commonly recognized. Authority
vested in the agent by the principal is actual authority. 43 It may be
established by the principal's express instructions to the agent, 44 or
may be implied from the principal's instructions concerning the
nature of the business undertaken, the time allotted to perform it, and
custom or trade practice.45 In some cases, no actual authority is vested
in the agent by the principal; only the appearance of authority is
created through the principal's representations to others which suggest an agent has authority.46 In these cases, the courts may vest
authority in the agent to protect an innocent person.47
Section 220(2) of the REsrATEMENT {SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957), which lists ten factors
which courts have often considered in imposing vicarious liability, reflects the disarray
of the case law. The factors are unweighted and their relevance is not explained.
42. See, e.g., Providence-Washington Ins. Co. v. Owens, 207 S.W. 666 (1918); Ferson, ·
Agency To Make Representations, 2 VAND. L. R.Ev. I, 9-10 (1948). While this descriptive
test often appears in the case law, the majority of courts use the terms "master,"
"servant," and "employment" in place of "principal," "agent," and "authority," as does
the tort section (§§ 215-67) of the RESTATEMENT, supra note 41. This Note will use
"principal" and "agent" rather than "master" and "servant" since the terminology is
virtually synonymous. R. POWELL, THE LAw OF AGENCY 22-23 (2d ed. 1961).
43. REsrAT.EM.ENT, supra note 41, § 7.
44. Id. See also R. POWELL, supra note 42, at 38-46.
45. REsrATEM.ENT, supra note 41, § 7. See also R. PoWELL, supra note 42, at 38-46.
46. R.ESTATE.'\LENT, supra note 41, § 8. See also R. PowELL, supra note 42, at 56-68;
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 8-B.
47. REsrAT.E.'\IENT, supra note 41, § 265. See also Hetherington, Trends in Enterprise
Liability: Law and the Unauthorized Agent, 19 STAN. L. R.Ev. 76 (1966); Comment,
Agency-Recovery in Tort Under the Theory of Apparent Authority or Agency by
Estoppel, 69 W. VA. L. R.Ev. 186 (1967).
The difference between actual and apparent authority is derived from the flow of
the principal's representations. In actual authority the flow is from principal to agent,
while in apparent authority the flow is from the principal to the third party.
In addition to actual and apparent authority, some commentators have conclud~d
that there is another basis upon which authority can rest, sometimes called usual aria-_
thority or inherent agency. However, this basis of liability appears to be a blend of
apparent and implied authority, most often found when the principal has seemingly
created authority in an agent by appointing him to a position recognized in the com-
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Three examples illustrate the application of these principles in the
student newspaper-university context. The first example is that of a
student reporter who, in good faith, has inaccurately reported a story,
thereby libeling an innocent person.48 The reporter has engaged in
conduct required by his agency and also has followed the express
guidelines of the newspaper by attempting to check the facts for
accuracy. No one could dispute that the inaccurate story was within
the reporter's actual authority.
The second example is that of a student reporter who has written
a story using inaccurate, unverified data while rushing to meet a
deadline.49 The reporter has violated the student newspaper rules
concerning verification, but was motivated by the need to give the
principal the benefit of the story. It is submitted that the reporter was
impliedly authorized to violate the rules since the principal should
anticipate that the reporter would not refrain from acts that appear
natural under the circumstances.50
In each example above, liability would not likely be imposed
upon the author, the editors, the student newspaper, or the university
if the statements fell within the ambit of New York Times. 51 Clearly,
there is no actual malice in the first case. Nor is malice likely in the
second example; the Court has indicated that the failure to verify
all the facts in a "hot news" item should not be considered malice.52
The third example, that of a libelous story written by a reporter
or editor out of personal malice, presents no problem under the New
York Times doctrine, but raises a more difficult problem in terms of
the agency analysis. While the reporter has no actual authority, the
principal should be liable for the defamation because the objective
facts create an appearance that the story was within the writer's
authority.53 To the statements· of the reporter are added the weight
munity as carrying certain powers to bind his principal, and thus does not merit separate discussion. See R. POWELL, supra note 42, at 41-53; R.EsrATEMENT, supra, § 8-A.
48. See text accompanying notes 22-30 supra.
49. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
50. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Mutual Bene.fit Health &: Accident Assn., 82 F.2d 115,
120 (8th Cir. 1936); Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 575-76, 30
Cal. Rptr. 350, 359 (1963); Mercado v. Hoefler, 190 Cal. App. 2d 12, 11 Cal. Rptr. 787,
790 (1961).
"A master cannot direct a servant to accomplish a result and anticipate that he will
always use the means which he (the master) directs or will refrain from acts which it is
natural to expect that servants may do." REsrATEMENT, supra note 41, § 230, Comment b.
51. See notes 22-30 supra and accompanying text.
52. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153-54, 158-59 (1967).
53. See Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S.E.2d 802 (1950), where a
reporter intentionally and falsely reported that a local official had been charged with
criminal conduct by a witness in a case. The official sued the newspaper, which defended
by arguing that it was not liable for the story because the reporter's personal vendetta
was outside the scope of his authority. The court rejected this argument, concluding that
the newspaper appeared to vest the reporter with authority, even though he actually
did not have it.
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of the reputation of the student newspaper and, further, the university itself. 154
These examples illustrate the spectrum of possible defamatory
situations. At one end is the unavoidable mistake, at the other, the
intentional libel. The conclusion can be drawn that every libelous
article written by an agent for publication in the newspaper falls
within the scope of the agent's actual or apparent authority. At this
point the earlier assumption of an agency between the student newspaper and the university must be considered.

2. The Agency Requirement
a. The traditional test for agency. If vicarious liability is to be
imposed upon the university for libel in student newspapers, an
agency relationship must be established. Agency is defined as "the
fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by
one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." 155 This
definition implies a three pronged test: consent, benefit, and the right
of control.
Consent is measured by an objective standard.156 When a newspaper has official status as a student organization, it seems clear that
a consensual relationship with the university exists. Even when a
student newspaper does not have such official status, the university
and the newspaper may manifest consent informally through conduct.157 At least where the university in fact exercises some form of
control over the paper, it should be held that a consensual relationship exists.
The benefit requirement arises from the notion that the agent
acts on behalf of the principal. 158 Since agency is usually associated
with business carried on for profit, the principal typically expects to
benefit financially by entering into the relationship.159 Far less tangible
benefits, however, are sufficient to support an agency relationship.
Domestic servants60 or gratuitous helpers61 usually provide benefits of
a nonfinancial character, yet their actions may give rise to vicarious
liability.
54. R.EsrATEMENT, supra note 41, § 247, Comment c. See also id. §§ 165, 254, 265.
55. R.EsrATEMENT, supra note 41, § 1.
56. Id. § 1, Comment b.
57. See, e.g., Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Heims v. Hanke,
5 Wis. 2d 465, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958). See also R.EsrATEMENT, supra note 41, §§ 1, 15.
58. See Mitchell v. Resto, 157 Conn. 258, 253 A.2d 25 (1968); Weatherman v. Ramsey, 207 N.C. 270, 176 S.E. 568 (1934). See also R.EsrATEMENT, supra note 41, §§ 1, 14,
14A-M.
59. Cf. R. POWELL, supra note 42, at 1-4.
60. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § I, Comments d, e, § 220, Comments a, c.
61. See Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis.
2d 465, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958).
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A university could conceivably derive three types of benefits from
a student newspaper: financial, educational, and informational. But
the likelihood of obtaining financial benefits is small. Most student
newspapers are not profit-making enterprises and the university must
provide funds for their operation. 62 Of more practical importance are
the educational benefits that the university receives by publishing a
student newspaper. These benefits are obvious when the newspaper
is used as a teaching device integrated into the curriculum, but also
arise from extracurricular student newspapers. Even where the newspaper is hostile to the administration, a university receives a benefit
through the development of students who can think perceptively
and critically. A newspaper that serves as a forum for debate and
discussion facilitates an atmosphere of intellectual freedom and enhances the vitality of the university community. Finally, a student
newspaper benefits the university by disseminating information of
particular concern to the university community.
While a finding of benefit is necessary to establish the agency
requirement, it is not sufficient. Other relationships, such as buyerseller or stockholder-corporation, can be characterized to include
benefits similar to those created through an agency. 63 Therefore,
courts also require the presence of the control element. Early formulations of this requirement centered around the principal's actual
control over the agent's physical movements, even though a principal
who employed more than one agent could not always be in physical
control of each agent's conduct. 64 The leading case of Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Rahn65 changed the emphasis from the principal's
actual control to his "right to direct the manner in which the business
shall be done as well as the result to be accomplished." 66 But that case
still clung to the concept that the principal must be able to direct the
agent's physical conduct. This concept proved inadequate since
principals often employ agents with special skills lacked by the principal. A test that did not require control over the details of physical
conduct was needed. The concept of "enterprise control" has answered that need: some courts and commentators have viewed control
in terms of the right to make management and policy decisions. 67
62. Over seventy-five per cent of the student newspapers responding to an informal
survey by the Review reported receiving a subsidy from the sponsoring university, either
in the form of activity fees or through general revenues. See Appendix infra.
63. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 41, §§ 14A-M.
64. See Kahn-Freund, Servants and Independent Contractors, 14 MODERN L. R.Ev.
504 (1951). Cf. R. POWELL, supra note 42, at 16-19.
65. 132 U.S. 518 (1889).
66. 132 U.S. at 523.
67. See, e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957);
Douglas, supra note 40, at 586-87. Cf. Peterson v. Brinn & Jensen Co., 134 Neb. 909, 280
N.W. 171 (1938); R. POWELL, supra note 42, at 16-19; Kahn-Freund, supra note 64, at
506-07.
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Under this view, a principal has control over an agent whenever
the former can direct the latter to employ his skills to accomplish a
certain result; the principal is not required to direct the agent in the
details of his task.
Two control mechanisms are likely to be present in this situation.
The first is the university's power over the student newspaper's
finances. Universities have typically supported student newspapers by
providing revenue and donating such items as office space, equipment,
supplies and a substantial range of services from budget planning to
duplication/18 In return for providing financial support a university
will frequently require the student newspaper to submit all its contracts to the university for approval. 69 Thus, the university, through
its financial power, has established control over the student newspaper,70 since it cannot function without the university's approval.
Another important, but less obvious, means of establishing control
over the student newspaper is through the university's inherent power
to operate or regulate activities associated with it.71 A student newspaper can be differentiated from any other distributed on campusfrom the New York Times to an underground newspaper-when it
has the status of an official student organization.72 In this situation,
the university could promulgate regulations, enforceable under threat
of termination of the official status of the student newspaper, imposing
its own conceptions of managerial and, in some instances, editorial
policy.73
Even an unexercised power should be sufficient to establish the
university's right of control. In Rubtchinsky v. State University of
68. Over ninety per cent of the student newspapers answering the Review survey
reported that they received some support of this type from the university. See Appendix

infra.
69. See, e.g., Purdue Exponent Review Board Report, App. VI-B, at 5 (1969). Although university attorneys who participated in the Review survey were not specifically
asked about retention of contract approval power, over one half indicated that the university retained this type of power. See Appendix infra.
70. See Purdue Review Board, supra note 69, App. VI-B, at 5-9.
71. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192 (1972), quoting Esteban v. Central Missouri
State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970): "'We
• • • hold that a college has the inherent power to promulgate rules and regulations;
that it has inherent power properly to discipline; that it has power appropriately to
protect itself and its property, that it may expect that its students adhere to generally
accepted standards of conduct.' " In his concurring opinion in Healy Chief Justice
Burger noted:
I read the basis of the remand as recognizing that student organizations seeking
the privilege of official campus recognition must be willing to abide by valid rules
of the institution applicable to all such organizations. This is a reasonable condition insofar as it calls for the disavowal of resort to force, disruption, and interference with the rights of others.
408 U.S. at 195. See generally Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Au-

thority To Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Non-Constitutional Analysis, 117
U. PA. L. REV. 373 (1969).
72. See note 10 supra.
73. See note 71 supra.

1072

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:1061

New Y ork74 a suit was filed against the university by the parents of an
eighteen-year-old student injured while participating in an activity
sponsored by the Campus Student Association. The university argued
that the Student Association had planned the whole activity and
operated as "a separate and distinct entity ... from the college." 76
Noting, however, that under the constitution of the Student Association the president of the university had full veto power over the
activity, the court found the university in sufficient control of the
activity to justify the imposition of liability.76 The relationship between the Student Association and the University was found to be
"consonant with the effort to grant college students as much autonomy as possible in their extracurricular activities while still retaining
final control in the hands of adult authority." 77 The retention of
ultimate control, whether exercised or not, was sufficient for vicarious
liability purposes.78
The relationship between the university and its student newspaper
varies greatly from school to school; thus, the significance of the forms
of control discussed above can be more fully understood when viewed
in the context of specific fact situations. Because the vast majority of
student newspapers are unincorporated associations,79 their variations
will be set forth first, through the use of four models that illustrate a
range of student newspaper-university relationships. Then, the special
significance of independent incorporation will be examined.
Model A typifies unincorporated student newspapers that are
operated by the university as part of the curriculum. The newspaper
is operated by the journalism department as a training device for
journalism students and there is supervision by faculty members
who read and pass upon the acceptability of articles. The university
also provides the newspaper with operating revenue, facilities, supplies, and services. In addition, the university retains the power to
approve all newspaper contracts. In short, the university exercises
virtually complete control over the student newspaper.
74. 46 Misc. 2d 679, 260 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Ct. CI. 1965).
75. 46 Misc. 2d at 681, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
76. However, since the court also found that the university had not violated any duty
owed to the student, liability was not imposed.
77. 46 Misc. 2d at 681, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
78. The legal advisors of a student-faculty committee appointed to examine the
relationship between Purdue University and its student newspaper and to recommend
changes concluded that the university had control over the publication even though the
constitution of the newspaper purported to keep editorial authority solely in the student editor. They based this conclusion on the university's inherent power over student organizations:
Since the constitution [of the student newspaper] was conditional upon approval
of the University and since the University reserves the right to revise it, the constitution itself is an indication the ultimate power rests with the University, although
it has seen fit to delegate terminable editorial authority to the student organization.
Purdue Review Board, supra note 69, App. VI-B, at 13. See also id. at 2-17.
79. See Appendix infra.
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In model B the university dominates the unincorporated newspaper's financial structure and has retained contract-approval power
in return for its financial aid.80 But in this model the student editors
have complete editorial freedom, and the university disclaims any
intent to control editorial policy. Nevertheless, the contract-approval
power gives the university the right of control. Moreover, the university may also have such a right through its inherent power if the
newspaper is an official student organization. The essential difference
between this model and model A is in the amount of discretion
given to students. Yet, the greater discretion given to the students in
model B could be withdrawn at any time. The right of control exists
even though the university disclaims it.81
Model C presents a more difficult situation for concluding that
the university controls the unincorporated student newspaper. In
this model the university does not provide the newspaper with any
financial support or technical assistance. Moreover, the university
does not exercise any actual managerial or editorial control, nor even
approve the newspaper's contracts. The only significant contact between the university and the student newspaper is the paper's status
as an official student organization. However, even this sole contact
may be sufficient to establish the university's control. The student
newspaper's official status should give the university the inherent
power to make and enforce regulations dictating managerial and
editorial policies.
Model D assumes the same facts as model C except that the newspaper is not an official student organization. In this case there is no
ground for concluding that the control requirement is met.
These models illustrate the range of student newspaper-university relationships, from virtual identity to no contacts at all. In each
case, except for model D, a court could conclude that vicarious liability should be imposed. The benefits necessary to establish the university as a principal consist of the various educational and informational benefits that the university derives. 82 Control sufficient to meet
either the Singer test83 or the enterprise test84 is also present. In each
of the first three models the university, through the use of the financial or inherent power mechanisms, could either completely direct
the details of the editors' and staff's employment or, alternatively,
take over the policy-making function. Thus, the fulfillment of both
the agency requirement and the authority requirement, discussed
80. Over one half of the university attorneys answering the Review survey reported
that their university's relationship to the student newspaper was similar to the one described by this model. See Appendix infra.
81. See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
82. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
83. See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
84. See notes 67 supra and accompanying text.
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above,85 together suggest that universities generally should expect
to be held vicariously liable for defamatory material in unincorporated student publications.
However, when a student newspaper is independently incorporated a significant new element is added to the calculus of values that
bear on the vicarious liability problem. Given that incorporation is
viewed generally as a means of limiting liability, does the independent incorporation of a student newspaper obstruct the imposition of
vicarious liability upon the university?
When the American Association of University Professors published its Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students86 it
stated: "The student press should be free from censorship and advance approval of copy, and its editors and managers should be free
to develop their own editorial policies and news coverage." 87 The
Joint Statement concluded that the best means of achieving this
objective would be through "an independent corporation financially
and legally separate from the university." 88 In addition to the concern
for promoting editorial freedom, another reason for separate incorporation was that "[w]here financial and legal autonomy is not possible, the institution, as the publisher of student publications, may
have to bear the legal responsibility for the contents of the publications." The clear inference from this statement is that if the newspaper is legally and financially autonomous the university will be
insulated from liability. However, even where a student newspaper
is separately incorporated financial independence is not likely to be
achieved.89 Large independently incorporated student newspapers
may enjoy the luxury of university aid90 and depend upon its existence.91 The possibility of incorporation coexisting with some form of
dependence raises several questions. If a newspaper is legally separate
but financially dependent upon the university, will a court ignore the
legal barrier and hold the university vicariously liable? In the absence
of financial dependence, would an independent corporation that was
an official student organization provide a sufficient basis for imposing
vicarious liability on the grounds suggested above, that the university
has an inherent power over its student activities?
It is suggested that when consent and benefit are present, control
85. See notes 43-54 supra and accompanying text.
86. 54 A.A.U.P. BULL. 258 (1968).
87. Id. at 260.
88. Id.
89. See Appendix infra,
90. The University of Michigan purchases 1800 subscriptions for faculty and staff.
Purdue Review Board, supra note 69, App. II-G.
91. Henry Grix, a 1969 Daily editor, noted in a letter to C. Michael Abbott that
"[i]n fact the one threat the University can make is to make us totally independent;
there ·is a good chance we would quickly go broke." Abbott, supra note 13, at 14 n.44.
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should be analyzed in terms of the mechanisms set forth earlier, without regard to the actor's corporate status. Since the realities of control,
rather than mere considerations of form, appear most important, the
university should be liable whether or not the student newspaper is
incorporated in situations equivalent to models A, B, and C above.
However, the problem may not be merely one of form versus substance. The corporate form carries with it a privilege of limited
liability, disregarded only in rare circumstances.92 There is, indeed,
authority that the traditional rules of agency will be relaxed when
considering whether a subsidiary corporation is an agent of its parent.03 Thus the fact of incorporation itself may militate against finding vicarious liability. Regardless of how the issue is determined in
this context, there will often be consent, benefit, and control sufficient
to justify the imposition of vicarious liability upon the university for
defamation published in its student newspaper.
b. Constitutional limitations upon a university's control of a
student newspaper: vicarious liability reconsidered. As evidenced by
New York Times and its progeny, the first amendment plays a significant role in the synthesis of the substantive law of libel. But the first
amendment may affect not only the determination of primary liability
but also the ability of the university to control effectively the opera92. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D.
Wis. 1905). However, a court might "pierce the corporate veil" where an incorporated
student newspaper is involved, thereby either refusing to recognize the newspaper and
university as separate entities or, to the e.xtent that the newspaper is a principal shareholder, refusing to recognize the separation between the corporation and its shareholders. While a detailed analysis of this problem is beyond the scope of this Note,
several observations can be made. The courts will pierce the corporate veil only when
they perceive some fundamental unfairness in maintaining separation. See Bartle v.
Home Owners Cooperative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 106, 127 N.E.2d 832, 833 (1955). Factors
that are often cited include a disregard for the formalities of corporate existence, a
commingling of affairs, or thin capitalization. See Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641
(1961). But see Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585
(1966). See generally Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 979, 994-98
(1971). However, because the case law arises in a commercial setting, any analogy to the
university-student newspaper context must be drawn with caution.
Nevertheless, the unive1-sity can minimize whatever risk of piercing exists by adopting several measures. First, the formalities of corporate separation should be rigorously
adhered to in forming the student newspaper corporation and in carrying on its business. See Douglas &: Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations,
39 YALE L.J. 193, 196-97 (1929); Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the
Torts of Their Corporations?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190, 1193-94 (1967).
Second, the student newspaper should be operated in a fair manner considering the
risk of a libel action. For e.xample, if the newspaper's assets are small, profits or operating funds should be allocated to the purchase of insurance before paying salaries to
student editors and managers. Third, the separation of the newspaper and the university
should be emphasized to the public by a disclaimer stating that the views of the newspaper are not necessarily those of the university. Further, a statement of purposes in
the corporate charter should include separateness of editorial control, if appropriate.
93. F. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 92-93 (1931). See Berkey v.
Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94-95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
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tion of a student newspaper. Where first amendment considerations
are applicable, the question whether the university meets the. control
requirement for agency must be reconsidered. This section will
examine the extent to which the first amendment limits the university's control over the publication of libel in student newspapers
as well as the implications of these limitations on the imposition of
vicarious liability.
Although one of the most significant types of control that the university could exercise over a student newspaper would be control
over its editorial policy, recent judicial recognition of the first amendment rights of students suggests that there may be important constitutional limitations on the extent of such control. By the terms of both
the first and fourteenth amendments, freedom of speech and the press
are protected against interference from governmental or "state action.''94 There is certainly no difficulty in .finding "state action"
where a state university is concerned.95 But whether state action
can be found in the private university for first amendment purposes
is a largely unanswered question. The various state action theories,
which have developed in other contexts and for other purposes, might
be applied to the private university for first amendment purposes.96
94. See generally P. KAUl'ER, CmL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 127-66 (1962);
Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69 (1967); Lewis, The Meaning of State
Action, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 1458 (1960); Van Alstyne &: Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L,
REv. 3 (1961).
95. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 170 (1972); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F.
Supp. 1329 (1970).
96. For an analysis of the potential presence of state action in the private university,
see H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUMBRA
(1969); O'Neill, supra note 1; Schubert, State Action and the Private University, 24
RUTGERS L. REv. 323 (1970); Developments, supra note 3, at 1154-63.
Recognizing that a clear private-public distinction is rarely present in our modern
institutions and enterprises the Court has declared that a "sifting [of] facts and weighing [of] circumstances" is necessary to determine whether the state is "significantly involved" in what might appear to be private activity. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163, 172-73 (1972). Thus, in determining whether sufficient state action is present
in a private university, a court would consider the wide variety of factors that it has
examined in previous cases including state financial assistance through direct grants,
scholarships, and tax exemptions, the participation of state officials in the administration of the private university, the degree of state regulation of the university through
accreditation, attendance, diploma or employment Tequirements, as well as the extent
to which the private university performs a public function by providing educational
opportunities which the state might otherwise have to supply. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Griffin v. County School
Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957), for the various criteria of state
action. One district court found state action to be present in a major private university,
based on a combination of the factors cited above, but the holding was reversed at a
new trial. Guillery v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.),
vacated, 207 F. Supp. 554, afjd. & remanded per curiam, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.), revd. on
retrial, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962). It is unlikely that any one of these factors by
itself would be sufficient; rather a combination of all of the factors, each heavily
weighted toward state control, would probably be necessary in order to support a find-
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But given our society's traditional respect for the independence of the
private university, 97 it is unlikely that the courts would be inclined
to find "state action" in this situation. The constitutional limitations
on editorial control are probably applicable only to state universities.
An examination of these limitations should begin with Tinker v.
Des A1oines Independent Community School District98 in which the
Supreme Court held that the first amendment prohibited a high
school from disciplining students for wearing black arm bands as a
protest against the Vietnam War. The Court declared that "[i]t can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.'' 99 However, restrictions could be imposed upon a student's
freedom of expression if "necessary to avoid material and substantial
interference with schoolwork or discipline ...." 100 The Court has
reaffirmed its commitment to protection of the first amendment rights
of students in subsequent decisions.101
•
Both before and after Tinker, a number of cases have arisen
challenging editorial control over student newspapers at state universities.102 Most of these cases have involved censorship of alleged
ing of state action in this context. See Moose Lodge No. 17 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972),
where the fact that a "private club" was subject to a certain amount of regulation by
the state was not sufficient to support a finding of state action.
Many of the Court's most expansive "state action" decisions have been in the area
of racial discrimination, the historical target of the fourteenth amendment. It is questionable whether the Court would strive quite so hard to find state action in an ostensibly "private" institution when racial discrimination is not involved.
A finding of state action would presumably subject the private university to a wide
range of constitutional limitations. Thus a private university might think avice before
defending against a libel claim by urging that because of the presence of state action
it was unable to exercise "control'' over the student paper.
97. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 96, at 12, 30.
98. 393 U.S. 503 (1968).
99. 393 U.S. at 506.
100. 393 U.S. at 511.
101. See, e.g., Papish v. Board of Curators, 41 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S., April 12, 1973);
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). In Healy the Court observed that "the precedents
of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for
order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses
than in the community at large." 408 U.S. at 180.
102. Joyner v. Whiting, No. 72-1630 (4th Cir., April 10, 1973) (state college president
may not cut off funds of the student newspaper because he disagrees with editorial views
expressed, but the president may seek judicial relief against discriminatory practices by
the paper); Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971) (once the student
newspaper was open to commercial advertisements, the state university administration
and student editorial board could not reject an advertisement due to its editorial content); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Colo. 1971) (state college's attempt to
change student newspaper from a forum of student expression to instructional tool
controlled by mass communications department was not done with sufficient clarity and
notice to allow an exercise of restraint over student writing); Korn v. Elkins, 317 F.
Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970) (state university officials could not restrain publication of a
picture of a burning American flag on the cover of a student publication); Antonelli v.
Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970) (faculty advisory board of a state college
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obscenity103 or controversial political issues.104 While no reported case
has squarely faced the issue of whether the university may exercise
control to prevent the publication of defamatory material in a student
paper,105 no university has been able to establish its right to exercise
editorial control over the student newspaper.106
The "material and substantial disruption" test of Tinker evolved
in the context of symbolic speech in the high school setting. Our
society assumes a greater degree of maturity on the part of university
students than high school students; the exercise of free expression is
less likely to result in material and substantial disruption in the university than in the high school.1°7 As a practical matter it will be
student newspaper could not require student articles to be submitted for approval
prior to publication); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D.
Ala. 1967) (state college administration could not prohibit the editor of student newspaper from publishing material critical of the state legislature or suspend him from
school for doing so); Panarella v. Birenbaum, 37 App. Div. 2d 987, 327 N.Y.S.2d 755
(1971) (administration of state colleges may not prohibit "attacks on religion" in student
newspapers). Although it concerned a high school newspaper, Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F.
Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (high school administration could not prohibit a student newspaper from publishing a paid political advertisement where the paper had previously
been used as a forum for free expression of ideas), has apparently been influential in the
university newspaper cases. It should be noted that in all of these cases the courts
addressed themselves to the individual facts at hand and did not explore the ultimate
limits of the first amendment rights of students. Most of the courts acknowledged that
the "material and substantial disruption" test of Tinker was applicable to the student
press but concluded that the administration failed to establish any such disruption.
See generally Trager, Freedom of the Press in College and High School, 35 ALBANY L.
REv. 161 (1971).
Questions concerning the first amendment rights of university students have recently
arisen in other contexts as well. Smith v. University of Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777 (1969),
and Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188 (1969), invalidated university regulations
prohibiting students from inviting certain types of individuals to speak on campus.
Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967), struck down
university regulations which required prior approval of parades and demonstrations.
103. See, e.g., Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970).
104. See, e.g., Joyner v. Whiting, No. 72-1630 (4th Cir., April 10, 1973); Lee v. Board
of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273
F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
105. In Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Colo. 1971), the faculty advisor of a
state college student newspaper required the student editors to delete a seemingly mild
editorial and the caption to an editorial cartoon from the paper on the grounds that
they were potentially libelous. The court did not reach the question of whether the
administration could censor "potentially libelous material" but did observe that
[i]n the context of an educational institution, a prohibition on protected speech,
to be valid, must be "necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with
schoolwork or discipline." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District .••• No such justification has been offered here. While Mr. McAvoy did
suggest that he was concerned about libel, defendants made no effort to prove that
plaintiff Trujillo's writings were libelous as a matter of Colorado law and also
unentitled to first amendment protection as a matter of federal law.
322 F. Supp. at 1270-71.
106. See cases cited in note 102 supra.
107. A number of cases interpreting the scope of Tinker at the high school level have
concerned school regulations imposing prior submission and approval requirements on
the distribution of literature (generally applied against underground newspapers) on the
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seldom, if ever, that the courts will approve editorial restraints on a
student newspaper imposed by a state university under the Tinker
test. The degree of first amendment protection accorded the student
press may well be as great as that accorded the commercial press.
The most effective means by which a university could control the
editorial policy of the student press would be through some form of
regulation requiring prior approval of articles. Yet, such a requirement would appear to fall within Near v. Minnesota's108 famous admonition that "liberty of the press, historically considered and taken
up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not
exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship."109
While the Court has observed that libel is not constitutionally protected speech, 110 this does not necessarily mean that prior restraints
imposed upon the dissemination of libel are constitutionally acceptable. Near itself suggests the contrary since the Court invalidated a
statute aimed at enjoining the publication of a "malicious, scandalous
and defamatory newspaper." 111 Moreover, while the Near Court provided explicit exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine for material
affecting the national security during the time of war, obscenity,112
and material inciting acts of violence or urging the overthrow of govemment,113 no similar exception was created for libel. Moreover, the
recent landmark case of New York Times v. United States114 bears
witness to the Court's continuing disapproval of prior restraints on
the press even where important national security interests may be at
stake. So long as the defamation laws continue to exist, however, they
high school premises. See, e.g., Fujishema v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir.
1972); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of
Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970).
Because of the need for stricter discipline at the high school level as well as the possible
differences between publishing and circulating material, these cases should not be
considered controlling on the question of administration censorship over student newspapers in the university context.
108 283 U.S. 697 (1930).
109. 283 U.S. at 716.
While the doctrine of prior restraint is firmly established, the Court has never
defined its contours with complete clarity. At its very least the doctrine means that
"[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression [bears] a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1962). For a
discussion of the various aspects of the doctrine see T. EMERSON, THE SYSI'EM OF FREE·
DOM OF EXPRESSION 503-12 (1970); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW&:
CoNTEMP, PROB. 648 (1955) [hereinafter Emerson, Prior Restraint]. See also Times Film
Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 50-78 (Warren, C.J., dissenting), 78-84 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
110. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
111. 283 U.S. at 702.
112. In Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441, 445 (1957), however, the Court
suggested that the doctrine of prior restraint is applicable even in the area of obscenity.
113. 283 U.S. at 716.
114. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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provide a private remedy for libel, thereby minimizing the need for
prior restraint. Prior restraint of the press as a means of preventing
the dissemination of libel is contrary to the established policies of the
first amendment.115
Even if prior restraints on student newspapers were not per se
invalid, it might be impossible to devise a system of prior review that
would be constitutionally adequate from a procedural standpoint.116
In the area of obscenity the Court has approved prior review of motion pictures,117 even though they qualify as speech under the first
amendment.118 However, in Freedman v. Maryland119 the Court declared that to withstand constitutional scrutiny such a system must
comply with certain procedural requirements. First, the state must
bear the burden of proof.120 Second, any advance submission require115. In Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1335-38 (D. Mass. 1970), the court
applied the doctrine of prior restraint to invalidate a system under which a student
newspaper was required to submit all material to a faculty committee for prior approval.
It might be urged that an exception to the prior restraint doctrine should be made
where the student press is involved on the ground that the potential for disruption of
the academic community through the publication of libelous material would warrant
some degree of prior review. But it is unlikely that libelous material in a student paper
would be capable of wreaking havoc on the university community. As the court noted
in Antonelli, 308 F. Supp. at 1336:
Obscenity in a campus newspaper is not the type of occurrence apt to be significantly disruptive of an orderly and disciplined educational process. • • • The
university setting of college-age students being exposed to a wide range of intellectual experience creates a relatively mature marketplace for the interchange of ideas
so that the free speech clause of the First Amendment with its underlying assumption that there is positive social value in an open forum seems particularly
appropriate.
Indeed, considering the current state of student activism, prior restraint of a student
publication by the university might be more likely to cause a "material and substantial
disruption" by triggering demonstrations, protests and classroom boycotts than practically anything that the paper could print.
In regard to libel, the student press might be distinguished from the commercial
press in terms of the relationship between editorial control and potential liability. The
owners of a commercial newspaper (corporate considerations aside) who may be
potentially liable for defamation judgments may impose as much prior restraint on
their editorial staff as they feel necessary to protect themselves. Yet, the doctrine of
prior restraint would appear to prohibit the university from exercising similar review
over its staff although it might also be held liable for any defamation published. If it
were possible to censor with precision then perhaps this argument would be entitled
to greater consideration. But one of the rationales underlying prohibition of prior
restraints is that censorship invariably tends toward excess. Emerson, Prior Restraint,
supra note 109, at 656-59. If the university were allowed a right of prior approval to
protect itself against liability for defamation, the inevitable result would be the suppression of a certain amount of nondefamatory material regardless of good faith on the
university's part. The important first amendment values at stake should not be
sacrificed to this end since the university is capable of protecting itself against liability
through other means.
116. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process,'' 83 HARv. L. R.Ev. !,_18 (1970).
117. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
118. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 497 (1952).
119. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
120. 380 U.S. at 58.
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ment must not be administered so that a censor's adverse decision
would carry practical finality. 121 Third, the procedure must provide
for a prompt judicial determination of the question.122
If prior restraints were allowed for student newspapers, it is probable that the Court would at least insist upon adherence to these
procedural requirements.123 Yet, it is unlikely that they could be met
where a newspaper is involved. The "immediacy" value of news articles and editorials is far greater than that of motion pictures. It would
be difficult, if not impossible, to ensure judicial review promptly
enough to protect the "newsworthiness" of the material in issue. As
a practical matter, the university might not consider censorship worth
the effort and expense when faced with the burden of proof in an
official proceeding subject to judicial review.
Even in the absence of prior restraint, the university might be
able to exercise some degree of editorial control through subsequent
disciplinary proceedings against the newspaper. Of course, the university would run afoul of the first amendment if it attempted to
discipline student editors simply because it disagreed with the content
of published material.124 Moreover, to accord fourteenth amendment
due process, the university would have to promulgate clear and reasonable standards of conduct as well as provide constitutionally acceptable notice and hearing.125 In establishing standards of conduct
which would regulate activity in the area of the first amendment, the
university would need to be extremely precise in order to avoid
foundering on the overbreadth126 or vagueness doctrines. 127 Perhaps
the university could validly discipline student editors for intentional
and gross violations of the canons of journalistic ethics or for maliciously publishing material which they knew to be false or for publishing a statement with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.
While such a practice would constitute some degree of editorial control, it is a far cry from a procedure of prior approval under which no
allegedly libelous material would ever see daylight.
It must be concluded that the state university can exercise little
editorial control over a student newspaper without colliding with the
121. !180 U.S. at 58.
122. !180 U.S. at 58-59.
12!1. Antonelli v. Hammond, !108 F. Supp. 1329, 1!135 (D. Mass. 1970), applied the
Freedman standards to censorship of a student newspaper.
124. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 50809 (1968); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D. Mass. 1970).
125. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961). Cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
126. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1971). See also Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. R.Ev. 844 (1971).
127. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1963). See also Note, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 67 (1960).
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first amendment. Because the Supreme Court has not directly confronted the issue, however, it would not be surprising to find that
many state universities actually exercise a substantial degree of editorial control over student publications whether they may constitutionally do so or not. When such control exists in fact, it should be
taken into consideration in determining control for vicarious liability
purposes. Analysis may therefore focus on public universities that
both do not in fact control and cannot constitutionally control the
actions of student authors and editors leading to the publication of
a libel. In regard to these universities, does the first amendment
negate the earlier finding of agency and therefore vicarious liability?
The courts have never clearly indicated how complete the principal's domination must be under either the Singer text, consisting
of the right to control the agent's physical movement, or the enterprise test, consisting of the right to make management and policy
decisions. The application of Singer is uncertain because, although
the university does not retain control over the editorial work, it still
has the right to control many other details. Similarly, the result under
the enterprise test cannot be precisely determined. The university
no longer has the right to make managerial decisions in the area of
editorial policy, which is most critical to libel; however, it retains the
right to make other important policy decisions, for example, those
concerning the newspaper's financial structure. Most importantly, the
university surely always retains the right to determine whether to
sponsor a student newspaper at all. In short, while the first amendment may negate the most important aspect of the control relationship between a university and its student newspaper, other aspects
of the control relationship remain. Given the fluidity of the control
tests, a court might properly reach whatever result it felt was just.
The reasons for imposing liability upon the university for a student newspaper's defamatory torts are founded upon the traditional
justifications of vicarious liability. A fundamental consideration is
the desire to compensate for the injury to the plaintiff's reputation.
The plaintiff himself will usually be forced to absorb the loss unless
the university provides compensation.128 In addition, the university
is likely to have the most experience in evaluating and insuring
against the risks of a libel action. 129 It may also be able to self-insure
or to lower the cost of libel insurance by purchasing it in a package
covering all insurance needs. 130 Moreover, the university may spread
the costs of insurance, or a libel judgment, over the student body
through higher tuition. 131
128. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
129. See note 40 supra.
130. See notes 147-51 infra and accompanying text.
131. See note 40 supra.
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The policy considerations against imposing vicarious liability
arise from the application of the first amendment. ·when the university is constitutionally forbidden from exerting control over the
newspaper it seems unfair to impose liability upon it: The university
cannot take preventive action against the publication of the libel
except in the most limited sense of closing the newspaper down. 132
A second major consideration is that the imposition of vicarious liability upon the university may ultimately be detrimental to the
student press. If a university could be held vicariously liable even
though virtually powerless to prevent the publication of libel, the
consequences for student newspapers could be onerous. Concern for
the burden of a libel action might cause the university to place limits
upon or even to eliminate student newspapers. The essence of the
controversy, then, can be reduced to one of balancing the importance
of compensation against considerations of fairness to the university
and the potential adverse effect on the student press. The plaintiff's
interest in being compensated for the injury to his reputation should
yield to the protection of the press and the facilitation of the free
exchange of ideas.
Public universities that do not exercise editorial control over student publications should not be held vicariously liable for defamatory
material appearing in those student publications. Vicarious liability
should, however, be imposed generally upon both the public universities that in fact exercise editorial control and upon all private universities which, free of the first amendment limitation, have a right to
control their student publications, whether it is exercised or not.
B.

Communication Liability

Communication liability is based on the peculiar nature of defamation. Neither l~bel nor slander are actionable unless they are
communicated to others,313 a process referred to as publication.134
In view of the critical importance of publication, liability has been
extended beyond the author to include those who communicated, or
cooperated in communicating, defamatory statements.135 Communication liability is a form of personal rather than vicarious liability.
Some form of direct participation by the university in the publication
of the libel is necessary. Arguably, the university becomes a coopera1!12. However, its decision not to sponsor the student newspaper may not be based
on its opposition to the editorial policy. Joyner v. Whiting, Civil No. 72-1630 (4th Cir.,
April 10, 1973). See notes 98-115 supra and accompanying text.
133. The communication need not be made to a mass audience. Communication of
a libel to one other person has been deemed actionable. Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36,
175 N.E. 505, 244 N.Y.S. 28 (1931).
134. 1 F. HARPER &: F. JAMES, supra note 38, § 5.15 (1956).
135. Grinnell v. Cable-Nelson Piano Co., 169 Mich. 183, 191, 135 N.W. 92, 95 (1912).
See also Youmans v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214, 218-19, 47 N.E. 265, 266 (1897).
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tive participant in the publication of the libel whenever it aids the
student newspaper by providing various forms of financial aid. 136
Communication liability may be applicable where vicarious liability is not. For example, in La Barge v. Daily Orange, 187 a $938,000
libel action was filed against Syracuse University, its unincorporated
student newspaper, the author, editors, and financial advisor. Syracuse University moved for dismissal as to itself, arguing that the only
basis for liability was respondeat superior, and that the doctrine was
unavailable since the master-servant relationship between the university and the student editors was absent.138 The court rejected the
contention that vicarious liability was the only appropriate theory,
holding:
The label on the relationship-whether they are principal and agent,
employer and employee or fellow actors-is immaterial. "He who
furnishes the means of convenient circulation, knowing, or having
reasonable cause to believe, that it is to be used for that purpose, if
it is in fact so used, is guilty of aiding in the publication and becomes
the instrument of the libeler.''13 9
While the case was ultimately dismissed for failure to prosecute,140 it
indicates at least one court's willingness to adopt the theory of communication liability in a libel case involving a student newspaper.
However, several barriers may obstruct the development of communication liability as a viable theory in the university-student newspaper context. First, it is unclear how much participation is required
to impose liability upon the university. At least where the newspaper
is a forum protected by the first amendment, the university cannot
control editorial policy and is reduced to the role of a passive supplier
of services, much like an ordinary commercial supplier or a charitable
donor. Second, while communication liability does not allow, in the
absence of privilege, the defendant's good intentions or lack of negligence in publishing the libel to serve as a defense, this strictness has
136. The informal survey conducted by th~ Review revealed that over ninety per cent
of the student publications received some form of aid and assistance from their schools.
See Appendix infra for a :i;rercentage breakdown of the form of assistance received.
137. Civil No. 70-6597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 5th Dist., April 8, 1972) (dismissed for failure
to prosecute).
138. Brief for Syracuse University in support of Motion To Dismiss at 2-17, La
Barge v. Syracuse Univ.
139. La Barge v. Daily Orange, Opinion of March 4, 1971, denying defendant's,
Syracuse University, motion to dismiss at 6, quoting Youmans v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214,
218-19, 47 N.E. 265, 266 (1897).
140. Subsequent to the denial of Syracuse University's motion to dismiss, the United
States Supreme Court decided Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See
text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. In light of this and plaintiff's failure to proceed
with preliminary examinations, the suit was summarily dismissed. Renewed Motion To
Dismiss by Syracuse University (April 8, 1972); letter from Attorneys for Syracuse University to Michigan Law Review, Nov. 21, 1972.
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been relaxed for some secondary disseminators of libel. Those who
are merely outlets for mass communication journals, and who really
have little control over the editorial process, may avoid liability by
proving that they did not know, and were not negligent in failing
to discover, the libel contained in the journals.141 Where the university is prohibited by the first amendment from the exercise of editorial control, perhaps it, too, should be entitled to the same defense
based on the absence of negligence.
Finally, the utility of the communication liability theory, in regard to both public and private universities, is significantly limited
by the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan privilege of nonmalicious
reporting.142 Since communication liability is imposed upon the university because of its own actions as a participant in the publication
of the libel, it might be expected that actual malice on the university's part148 would have to be shown if the statement fell within the
ambit of New York Times. In comparison, vicarious liability would
not require a showing of actual malice on the university's part.
Rather, the plaintiff would only be required to show that the author
harbored malice, for that malice would be imputed to the university
as principal.144 A showing that the university itself maliciously participated in the publication of the libel would be unlikely. At the
very least it would require proof that the university entertained serious doubts about the truth of material being printed in the newspaper.145

III. CONCLUSION: PLANNING To MINIMIZE LIABILITY
This Note has examined the traditional theories that might give
rise to a university's liability for defamatory material published in its
student newspaper. Clearly, the threat of liability is cause for some
concern among university administrators. Therefore, it is worth exploring several planning devices that could be used to minimize or
eliminate a university's liability.
As was discussed above,146 separate incorporation of the student
newspaper will provide only an uncertain measure of protection for
141. Hartmann v. American News Co., 171 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1948); Albi v. Street &:
Smith Publications, 140 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1944); Bowerman v. Detroit Free Press, 287
Mich. 443, 283 N.W. 642 (1939); Balabanoff v. Fossani, 192 Misc. 615, 81 N.Y.S.2d 732
(Sup. Ct. 1948).
142. See notes 22-30 supra and accompanying text.
143. This would, of course, require a showing of malice on the part of some agent of
the university who was either actually or apparently authorized to exercise some form of
supervision or control over the newspaper or authorized to represent the university to
the public since a university could only act through its agents.
144. See, e.g., Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321, 334, 60 S.E.2d 802, 813
(1950). See generally Rl:sTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 272.
145. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
146. See notes 85-93 supra and accompanying text.
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the university. The surest device for minimizing the risk of university
liability is insurance against libel. This is already a popular form of
protection; over fifty per cent of schools answering the Review survey
carried some form of libel insurance.147 As Professor Calabresi has
pointed out, part of the justification for vicarious liability derives from
the idea that "the master is the best insurer, both in the sense of being
able to obtain insurance at the lower rates and· in the sense of being
most aware of the risk." 148 Insurance can minimize risk of liability
without altering the relationship between the university and the student publication. A disadvantage of insurance, especially for the
smaller private college, is cost,149 which may become an important
factor during these times of rapidly increasing costs of education, rising tuition, and shrinking enrollment. 150 Libel insurance also may not
cover punitive damages. 151 Yet, while insurance may be sufficient
from the university's point of view, it has one serious deficiency: it
is not preventive. Insurance does nothing to correct problems in personnel or procedure that led to publication of a libel.
Generally, the college campus functions an an enclave for the free
interchange of ideas and opinions; in a real sense the campus is society's outpost of reason. It is fitting that student newspapers be given
a large measure of independence. However, the student editors and
staff must understand not only the rights but also the responsibilities
of carrying on a free press. The students should understand what a
libel is, what their liability is for defamation, and what they can do
to prevent it. To achieve this goal the university should invite journalists to conduct seminars on professional responsibility.1152 Moreover, the student newspaper and the university should develop informal procedures for dealing with potentially libelous material. For
example, at the University of Michigan, if the Michigan Daily editors
believe material to be potentially libelous, they consult either a law
professor or another attorney and discuss it. The procedure is informal, and the student editors make the ultimate decision as to
publication.153
147. See Appendix infra.
148. Calabresi, supra note 39, at 543.
149. For example, the cost of insurance against liability for libel, invasion of privacy,
and similar torts for a :tvfidwest newspaper with a circulation of 10,000 and a "good
record" is 700 dollars annually (2,500 dollars deductible, 300,000 dollars maximum
coverage). Figures provided by Mindus & Mindus, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan.
150. See Recession Hits the Colleges, NEWSWEEK, March 23, 1971, at 63.
151. One university attorney responding to the Review survey noted that the university's insurance policy would not cover punitive damages.
152. See generally Nelson, Newsmen and the Times Doctrine, 12 VILL. L. REv. 738
(1967); McLeod & Hawley, Professionalization Among Newsmen, 41 JOURNALISM Q.
529 (1964).
153. Conversation with Professor Berlin, Chairman, Board of Student Publications,
University of Michigan, Oct. 15, 1972.
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Such measures require a high degree of good faith both by students and administration. But that is not inconsistent with the adult
relationship which should prevail. While such procedures do not
provide a legal insulation from liability, when carried on in an atmosphere of good faith, they are able to treat the roots of the problem rather than merely the symptoms.
APPENDIX
During the preparation of this Note, the Review undertook an
informal survey by mailing questionnaires to the editors-in-chief of
fifty university newspapers-including those at large, small, public,
and private institutions-as well as to the attorneys of these newspapers. The editors-in-chief of the newspapers were asked factual
questions concerning the size and composition of their annual budgets, aid furnished to them by the university, and procedures used for
screening potentially libelous material. The university attorneys were
asked whether the school newspaper was separately incorporated,
whether the university exercised, or could exercise, control, whether
the university had ever been sued for libel in a student publication,
and whether the university had insurance that could cover such a suit.

l.

NEWSPAPER SURVEY

Twenty-six newspapers responded as indicated below.

I) Annual Budgets (total of twenty-six)
Largest
Smallest
2) Newspapers receiving aid from the university,
in the form of:
a) Student activity fees or other university
funds.
b) Material and services donated without
charge or below market cost.
office space
office supplies
duplicating services
campus mail service
miscellaneous (budget planning, transportation, other)
Total of newspapers receiving some form of
aid from the university.

$3,600,000
700,000

1,500

19/26 (73%)
21/26
16/26
10/26
9/26
18/26

(81%)
(62%)
(38%)
(38%)
(69%)

12/26 (23%)
24/26 (92%)
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II.

ATI'ORNEY SURVEY

Twenty attorneys responded as indicated below.
I) Form of the newspaper's organization
a) separately incorporated
5/20 (25%)
b) unincorporated
15 /20 (75%)
2) Does the university exercise control, or could
it exercise control over the student newspaper?
Yes)
16/20 (80%)
No)
4/20 (20%)
Of the four answering no, three were at universities with separately
incorporated student newspapers.
3) Has the university ever been sued for libel in a
student publication?
Yes)
5/20 (25%)
No)
15/20 (75%)
Of these universities one reported being sued three times, for a
total of seven suits. Two universities supplied citations. See note 21
supra.
4) Does the university have insurance that would
cover a libel action?
Yes)
13 /20 (65%)
No)
7 /20 (35%)

